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Abstract:  How can we make rational decisions that involve transformative experiences,
that is, experiences that can radically change our core preferences? L. A. Paul (2014)
has  argued  that  many  decisions  involving  transformative  experiences  cannot  be
rational.  However,  Paul  acknowledges  that  some  traumatic  events  can  be
transformative experiences, but are nevertheless not an obstacle to rational decision-
making. For instance,  being attacked by hungry sharks would be a transformative
experience, and yet, deciding not to swim with hungry sharks is rational. Paul has
tried to explain why decisions involving “sharky” outcomes are an exception to the
rule.  However,  her  putative  explanation  has  been  criticized  by  Campbell  and
Mosquera (2020). In this paper, I offer a different solution to this problem. Roughly, I
argue  that  transformative  experiences  give  rise  a  problem  for  rational  decision-
making only if the decision can lead to satisfying some of our (new) core preferences,
but  can  also  frustrate  other  (new)  core  preferences.  I  also  argue  that  agents  can
partially project what traumatic transformative experiences are like.
Keywords:  transformative  experience,  rational  choice,  expected  value  maximization,
preferences, the Shark Problem
I look out my office window. It is a sunny winter day. It snowed during the night. In light of
this, I decide to go for a walk later. Why? Because I prefer to spend my afternoon bathing
in the sun, enjoying the fresh winter air, and admiring snow-covered gardens. My decision
is guided by my preferences and what is likely to satisfy them.
Most mundane decisions are like this. We try to do what will meet our preferences.
But  what  are  we  supposed  to  do  when  our  decisions  will  radically  change  our  core
preferences? Should we try to satisfy our present preferences, or our future ones? And how
are  we supposed to  know what  our  future preferences  will  be? These  are  some of  the
problems pertaining to transformative experiences, that is, experiences that can radically
change our core preferences.1
1 See  Paul  (2014)  on  transformative  experiences.  See  Pettigrew  (2019)  for  an  overview  of  decision-
theoretic principles for changing selves.  See also Ullmann-Margalit  (2006) for an earlier take on the
rationality of transformative decisions. See Bykvist (2006) on the prudential ought and changing selves. 
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In an influential book, L. A. Paul (2014) has roughly argued that many decisions
involving transformative experiences cannot be rational.2 The gist of Paul’s claim is this. In
order to decide rationally, you need to evaluate the various outcomes of a decision (and
their likelihood). You want to know which outcomes are valuable, or preferable for you.
However, transformative experiences might change your core preferences, and you cannot
project what it is like to have a transformative experience. For Paul, this means that you
cannot know if you will value some of the possible outcomes resulting from your decision.
This puts you in an epistemically problematic position for rationally deciding what to do.
However,  Paul  acknowledges  that  some  decisions  involving  transformative
experiences can be rational. Suppose I could decide to swim with hungry white sharks. I
know what a white shark is, and I have heard of shark attacks before. A reliable informant
tells me that the sharks have not eaten for several weeks, and that they will attack me if I
swim with them. It would be odd for me to think: “Ah, I cannot rationally decide not to
swim  with  these  sharks.  After  all,  being  attacked  by  sharks  would  change  my  core
preferences, and I have no idea what this experience will be like.” Paul (2014, 26-7) has
tried  to  explain  why these  types  of  scenarios  are  not  an  obstacle  to  rational  decision-
making.  However,  Campbell  and  Mosquera  (2020)  have  argued  that  her  putative
explanation leads to a serious problem. This is what they call the Shark Problem.
In this paper, I offer a solution to the Shark Problem that is compatible with Paul’s
central commitments concerning transformative experiences. Roughly, I argue that we can
partially know what it is like to have some transformative experiences, like being attacked
by sharks. I also argue that transformative experiences give rise to a problem for rational
decision-making  only  if  the  decision  can  lead  to  satisfying  some  of  our  (new)  core
preferences, but can also frustrate other (new) core preferences.  This condition excludes
decisions like swimming with sharks. In section 1, I present Paul’s thesis and the Shark
Problem more clearly. In section 2, I argue that agents can partially project what traumatic
transformative experiences are like. This leads me, in section 3, to formulate and defend my
solution to the problem.
2 See Paul (2014). See Pettigrew (2019, chap. 10) and Talbott (2016) for replies to Paul. See Campbell and
Mosquera (2020) on the shark problem for Paul’s view. Dougherty, Horowitz and Sliwa (2015) argue that
decisions involving transformative experiences can be rational, because transformative experiences are
not  an  obstacle  to  knowing  how  valuable  an  experience  is.  Paul’s  view  concerning  transformative
experiences also matter for a host of related debates. See, e.g., Paul (2017) and Cappelen and Dever
(2017) on indexicality and the first personal point of view.
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1. Transformative Experiences and the Shark Problem
1.1. Personally Transformative Experiences
Some experiences change who we are. A personally transformative experience “changes
you enough to substantially change your point of view, thus substantially revising your core
preferences or revising how you experience being yourself” (Paul 2014, 16). Paul gives
some examples of personally transformative experiences, such as:
1. Radical  life  changes.  Some life  changes,  such as  having a  child  or  choosing  a
career, can be personally transformative. When one deliberates on whether to have a
child, one does not know in advance what it is like to be a parent, and what kinds of
preferences one will have as a parent. The experience of having a child can radically
change your preferences. In order to know your preferences as a parent, one has to
make this choice and live the experience of having a child.
2. Gaining a new sensory ability. Some changes in the ability to hear, feel, taste, etc.
can be personally transformative.  When a deaf person deliberates on whether to
have a cochlear implant, he or she cannot know in advance what it is like to hear,
and what it is like not to be part of the deaf community. The experience of hearing
can radically change his or her preferences.
3. Having entirely new experiences. Some new experiences, such as eating durian or
Vegemite,  can  be  personally  transformative.  Durian  has  a  unique  and  radically
different taste from everything else. One’s future self might hate or love durian, but
in order to figure out what one’s future self will enjoy, one has to try durian.
4. Having  a  traumatic  experience.  Some  tragedies,  such  as  having  your  limbs
amputated  without  anaesthesia,  or  being  attacked by a  shark,  can  be  personally
transformative. These traumatic events can radically change our core preferences,
desires and goals.
1.2. Rational Decisions and Transformative Experiences
Paul (2014) thinks that transformative experiences are a serious problem for rational
decision-making. For Paul, rational decisions involve comparing outcomes based on what
one  prefers.  However,  in  transformative  experiences,  one’s  experiences  will  radically
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change one’s core preferences. This is a serious obstacle for deciding rationally what we
should do. 
First, what does Paul mean by rational? Paul says that rational agents satisfy the
requirements  of  decision  theory (Paul  2014,  19).3 For  instance,  she thinks  that  rational
agents  maximize  expected  value  (ibid.,  21).  Accordingly,  rational  agents  often  make
decisions that are sensitive to their preferences. For Paul, your preferences are an important
part  of  expected  value  maximization,  because  “what  counts  as  valuable  for  you  when
making a particular choice will depend on your dispositions, beliefs, and desires” (ibid.,
22). 
Not everyone thinks that rationality consists in satisfying the principles of decision
theory. Some think that rationality is mere coherence (J. Broome 2013; Worsnip 2018a,
2018b).  Others  think  that  rationality  consists  in  responding  to  the  reasons  one  has
(Kiesewetter 2018; Lord 2018). For simplicity, I will stick to Paul’s use of this term. Those
who accept a different theory of rationality can, in the foregoing, replace “rational” with
something like “optimize expected value,” and “rational deliberation” with “deliberation
aimed at optimizing expected value.”
Here is why transformative experiences are an obstacle to rational decision-making.
Consider the decision to have a child. Based on what one currently prefers, one might (or
might not) be inclined to have a child. However, one’s rational deliberation should also
factor what one’s future self will enjoy and dislike. After all, it is your future self that will
live  with  the  consequences  of  your  decision.  So,  one’s  rational  deliberation  should  be
sensitive to the evolution of one’s core preferences after making the decision to have (or
not to have) a child. The problem is that the decision to have a child is a transformative
experience. One does not know in advance what it is like to be a parent, and what kinds of
preferences one will have as a parent. This kind of knowledge is only accessible to those
who are familiar with the phenomenology of being a parent. Paul says:
When  a  newborn  is  produced,  both  parents  experience  dramatic  hormonal
changes and enter other new physiological states, all of which help to create the
physical realizers for the intensely emotional phenomenology associated with
the birth. These experiences contribute to the forming and strengthening of the
attachment  relation.  Further  characteristics  of  the  nature  of  the  attachment
manifested between you and your child, ones which can have a dramatic effect
3 Paul also refers to Weirich (2004), who is concerned with realistic requirements of decision theory (i.e.,
requirements of decision theory that can be useful and relevant for imperfect agents like us).
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on the experience of being a parent, are determined by the particular properties
of the actual child you produce. All of this generates the unique experience of
having one’s first child. (Paul 2014, 78)
So, for decisions such as having children, it is difficult to deliberate based on one’s future
core preferences.4
However,  Paul  acknowledges  that  some  decisions  involving  transformative
experiences are not an obstacle to rational decision-making. For instance, suppose you had
fine-grained  information  about  how  you, personally,  will  respond to  the  transformative
experience. For instance, suppose you had fine-grained information confirming that you
will be a happy and fulfilled parent, or that deciding to have a child will satisfy all your
future core preference. Then, perhaps you could rationally decide to have a child (ibid.,
126). However, this kind of fine-grained information is often unavailable to us. As Paul
says:
Empirical  research,  at  least  in  the  near  future,  isn’t  going  to  exhaustively
determine whether you should decide to have retinal surgery or not, or whether
you’d prefer being a violinist  to  being a  doctor....  [This] prevents you from
casually replacing your first personal evaluations with empirical data. (ibid.)
So, if this kind of information were available to us, transformative experiences would not
be an obstacle  to rational  decision-making. But  as it  happens,  this  information is  often
unavailable to us. So transformative experiences are often an obstacle to rational decision-
making.5
Here is another type of cases involving transformative experiences that is not an
obstacle to rational decision-making. Having your limbs amputated without anaesthesia, or
being  attacked  by  a  hungry  white  shark,  are  transformative  experiences.  Yet,  you  can
rationally determine that swimming with hungry white sharks (or refusing anaesthesia) is a
bad decision, even if it would involve a transformative experience.6 But then, how can we
distinguish  “sharky”  transformative  experiences  from  regular  ones?  Why  do  these
transformative experiences pose no problem for rationality?
4 Paul (2014, 38-40) discusses how decisions involving transformative experiences can have revelatory
value, (i.e., the value of having new experiences). Some decisions involving transformative experiences
can be rational because we want to have new experiences. But the problem remains if one does not prefer
having new experiences.
5 See Pettigrew (2019, chap. 10) and Dougherty, Horowitz and Sliwa (2015) for discussion of this point.
6 Of course, there is a remote chance that swimming with hungry white sharks will be perfectly safe. I will
come back to this complication in section 3.
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1.3. Paul’s Way of Dealing with Sharky Transformative Experiences
Paul gives an explanation of why “sharky” transformatives experiences are different from
regular ones. Her explanation involves cognitive modeling. 
According to  Paul,  when we deliberate  about what  we should do,  we “mentally
stop” and evaluate the various options available to us (Paul 2014, 26). Our goal is to select
the decision that maximizes expected value (ibid.). In order to figure this out, we project
forward different decisions and outcomes. Specifically, we project “experiential outcomes”
that are described by “what it’s like” sentences (ibid.).  So, when we deliberate, we ask
ourselves what it would be like to make decision A, and what it would be like to make
decision B, and so forth. This is what Paul calls cognitive modeling (ibid.). As she says:
When you are considering your options, you evaluate each possible act and its
experiential outcomes by imagining or running a mental simulation of what it
would  be  like,  should  you act,  for  each  relevant  possible  outcome of  each
relevant act. You simulate the relevant possible outcomes for yourself, that is,
you simulate what it would be like for you to have each of these experiences
and what your life would be like after these experiences. (ibid.)
The cognitive simulations allow us to rank various options and decisions, from most to
least  preferable.  However,  when  our  decisions  involve  transformative  experiences,  we
cannot run these cognitive simulations.  We are not in a position to project  experiential
outcomes,  because  the  decisions  involve  outcomes  that  are  radically  different  than
everything we have experienced before, and might radically change our core preferences.
However,  Paul  notes  that  some  rational  decisions  are  possible  without  running
cognitive simulations. For Paul, swimming with hungry white sharks is one of them. One
knows that such a decision is bad and irrational even without running cognitive simulations.
So, one can rationally decide not to swim with sharks without figuring out precisely what
it’s like to be attacked by sharks (ibid., 27).
Thus, the reason why decisions like “I will not swim with hungry white sharks” can
be rational is that they do not require cognitive modeling. These decisions are bad, and we
know this without running cognitive simulations.
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1.4. A Worry for Paul’s Explanation and the Discontinuity Objection
A worry with Paul’s explanation is this. On the one hand, Paul says that decisions involving
transformative experiences are not rational, because (i) we cannot project the experiential
outcomes of transformative experiences, a necessary condition for cognitive modeling, and
(ii)  we  do  not  know  how  our  core  preferences  will  evolve  after  we  go  through  a
transformative experience. On the other hand, she says that we can rationally decide not to
swim with  sharks.  For  most  of  us,  swimming  with  sharks  would  be  a  transformative
experience. We cannot project the experiential outcomes of this decision.7 Paul says this is
fine, because we do not need cognitive modeling to make such rational decisions. But then,
do we really need cognitive modeling for other, non-sharky decisions? Couldn’t we say that
cognitive modeling is optional for rational decision-making?
Campbell and Mosquera (2020) discuss an escape route on Paul’s behalf, and argue
that it fails. Here it is. Perhaps Paul thinks that there are two types of experiential outcomes.
There are  normal outcomes, such as getting a cochlear implant or becoming a parent. In
order to make rational decisions that involve normal outcomes, one has to be familiar with
the phenomenology of the outcomes (ibid., 3550-1). Paul’s claims in terms of experiential
outcomes  and  cognitive  modeling  apply  to  these  outcomes.  Then,  there  are  sharky
outcomes, such as being attacked by sharks or being hit by a bus (ibid.). These outcomes
can be evaluated without cognitive modeling (i.e., projecting experiential outcomes). This
escape route would, if successful, allow us to solve the tension described above. Paul’s
view would be restricted to  decisions  that  involve  normal outcomes only.  It  would not
apply to decisions that involve sharky outcomes.
However, Campbell and Mosquera argue that that the putative distinction between
normal outcomes and sharky outcomes raises a problem. They note that “a normal outcome
can  be  gradually  transformed  into  a  sharky  outcome”  (ibid.,  3552),  which  creates  a
discontinuity problem for evaluating outcomes.  This  is  what  they call  the discontinuity
objection.
Here is the gist of their argument. Suppose agents have to make a decision between
different lives. All of their options are transformative experiences. These options could be:
Become a parent, acquire a new sensory ability, become a vampire, etc. (for simplicity, we
7 Or at least: We cannot fully project this. I will come back to this point in section 3 (this is part of my
solution to the problem).
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will call each of these options an “experientially different life”). Their options are located
on a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum, agents will experience a very small amount of
intense pain. Then, each option involves a small increase in the amount of intense pain they
will experience. At the other end of the spectrum, agents experience the maximal amount of
intense pain (ibid.). For instance:
O1: Choose experientially different life 1, which involves one second of intense pain per
day.
O2: Choose experientially different life 2, which involves two seconds of intense pain per
day.
...
On: Choose experientially different life n. This life involves permanent intense pain.
The options on one end of the spectrum are normal outcomes (they are transformative, but
they are not that bad). However, the options on the other end of the spectrum are sharky
outcomes (they are transformative and really bad) (ibid., 3553).
Then,  there  must  be  a  boundary  or  a  threshold  between  the  range  of  sharky
outcomes and the range of normal outcomes (ibid.). The boundary could be sharp or vague.
Campbell and Mosquera first assume that it is sharp. For instance, perhaps O5000 is a normal
outcome, but O5001 is a sharky outcome. In this example, the sharp boundary would be O5000
(later  in  their  paper,  Campbell  and  Mosquera  discuss  various  generalizations  of  their
arguments  with  vague  thresholds,  and  epistemicist,  supervaluationist  and  ontic
interpretations of vagueness. See pp. 3555-3560). 
The discontinuity objection is this. Agents cannot compare various outcomes on the
spectrum with each other, because they involve experientially different lives. For instance,
agents cannot compare O1 with O5000, because they cannot grasp what these lives are like
unless they experience them. However, agents can conclude that O1  is better than O5001, or
that O5000 is better than O5001, even if they (still) cannot grasp what these lives are like. As
Campbell and Mosquera say, “we find it implausible that the agent’s ability to evaluate an
outcome and compare it to O1 vanishes due to the absence of just one fewer second of pain”
(ibid., 3553). 
Thus,  introducing  a  distinction  between  normal  outcomes  and  sharky  outcomes
creates a strange discontinuity in the way agents can evaluate outcomes. So, this escape
route is unavailable to Paul. This means that we have not solved the puzzle discussed at the
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beginning of this section: If cognitive modeling is optional for skarky outcomes, could we
also conclude that that it is optional for all outcomes? And if cognitive modeling is optional
for all outcomes, how can Paul argue that transformative experiences compromise rational
decision-making?
2. An Escape Route
2.1. Core Preferences, Cognitive Modeling and Transformative Experiences
I agree with Campbell and Mosquera that Paul’s explanation raises worries. Solving the
Shark Problem with a distinction between types of experiential outcomes raises a serious
problem. So, how are we going to draw the line between decisions such as becoming a
parent and decisions such as swimming with sharks?
Here is what we are trying to do:
(1) We  want  to  accommodate  the  claim  that  some  decisions  involving  transformative
experiences, such as choosing between swimming with sharks and not swimming with
sharks, can be rational.
(2) We want to accommodate Paul’s thesis, and in particular, her central claim that many
decisions  involving  transformative  experiences  do  not  square  well  with  rational
decision-making.8
(3) In accordance with Campbell and Mosquera’s claim, we should not make sense of (1)
and (2) by appealing to a distinction between normal outcomes that require cognitive
modeling, and sharky outcomes that do not require cognitive modeling.
Roughly, my solution is this: First, there can be partial cognitive modeling. Second,
transformative experiences give rise  a problem for rational decision-making only if  the
decision can lead to satisfying some of our (new) core preferences, but can also frustrate
other  (new) core  preferences.  Decisions  like  swimming with  sharks  do not  satisfy  this
condition,  because  they  can  only  frustrate  our  core preferences.  So,  even though these
decisions are transformative, they are not an obstacle to rational decision-making.
8 There are worries for Paul’s claim. See, e.g., Dougherty, Horowitz and Sliwa (2015) and Pettigrew (2015,
chap. 10). However, I wish to remain neutral on whether Paul is right. So, I am trying to find a solution to
the problem of sharky outcomes that is compatible with Paul’s thesis.
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In accordance with (1), my solution can explain why deciding not to swim with
sharks is rational.  In accordance with (2),  my solution is  compatible with thinking that
transformative experiences are often an obstacle to rational decision-making. Finally, my
solution does not rely on a problematic distinction between outcomes that require cognitive
modeling and outcomes that do not, which tallies well with (3).
In this section, I explain why there can be partial cognitive modeling. In the next
section, I explain why, relative to partial cognitive modeling, decisions like swimming with
sharks do not pose a threat for Paul’s argument.
2.2. Sharks Attacks and Partial Cognitive Modeling
For  Paul,  cognitive  modeling  is  essential  for  rationally  evaluating  outcomes.  Or  more
precisely: She thinks that, in the absence of fine-grained information about how one will
personally respond to an experience, cognitive modeling is necessary for rational decision-
making.9 However, we cannot project what it is like to have a transformative experience.
So, how can we know that decisions like swimming with hungry white sharks are bad? 
In response to this worry, I will first argue that the claim that we cannot project what
it  is  like  to  have  a  transformative  experience  is  too  strong.  That  is,  I  will  argue  that
transformative experiences  allow for  partial cognitive  modeling.  We cannot  fully grasp
what it is like to be attacked by sharks. But we can grasp some important features of all the
possible outcomes of this decision, and that is enough to warrant rational decision.10
How can agents partially  project what it  is  like to be attacked by sharks? First,
agents can foresee that deciding to swim with hungry white sharks will likely involve a
great degree of pain. Agents can project what pain is like. Second, they can arguably know
that this would be a traumatic event. Agents can project what traumatic events are like.
Third, agents can figure out that the recovery from a shark attack will take time, and that if
you lose a limb, you might need to adapt to your new reality, which can take months or
years. Agents can project what it is like to adapt to a new, more complex reality. There is a
number of things that agents can project when they are thinking of shark attacks.
9 See section 1.2. 
10 This  possibility  is  briefly  mentioned,  but  not  really  explored,  in  Paul  (2017,  199).  See  Dougherty,
Horowitz and Sliwa (2015) on a related notion of partial knowledge.
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This means that they can project  some central aspects of decisions like swimming
with sharks. Of course, perhaps agents cannot project what it is like to endure the specific
psychological and physical trauma of being attacked by sharks. And they might not know
how,  exactly,  their  preferences  will  evolve  after  such  a  traumatic  event.  But  their
knowledge of pain and traumas in general give them a partial idea of what it is like to be
attacked by sharks.
So, for decisions such as swimming with sharks, cognitive modeling can be helpful
to realize that all outcomes are bad. Of course, you cannot know exactly what it is like to
live  such a  traumatic  experience.  But  you know what  pain  feels  like,  you know what
traumas feel like, and so you can have a rough but sufficiently informative picture of what
it is like to be attacked by sharks. This is part of the explanation why you can rationally
decide not to swim with sharks.
Note, however, that partial cognitive modeling is sometimes insufficient for making
rational decisions. Consider the decision to taste Durian. Suppose I am told by a reliable
informant that ripe Durian has a creamy texture, like custard. The experience of creamy
food is  familiar  to  me.  Accordingly,  I  can partially  project  what  eating  Durian  is  like.
However,  in  this  example,  partial  cognitive  modeling  would  not  solve  the  problem
described by Paul for rational decision-making. For example, the smell and taste of Durian
are radically different from everything I have experienced before, and eating Durian could
change my culinary preferences. For Paul, these are obstacles to rationally deciding to eat
Durian. The mere fact that I can project what the texture of Durian is like does not solve the
problem.
For now, I merely want to argue that partial cognitive modeling is possible. I will
come back to the rationality of decisions based on partial cognitive modeling in section 3.
2.3. Is Partial Cognitive Modeling Ad Hoc?
The claim that cognitive modeling can be partial, or can come in degrees, is not ad
hoc. Many ordinary experiences suggest that we can partially project what it is like to have
some radically different experiences. This happens when we are empathetic towards people
with radically different lives.11 Consider the following case:
11 See DeTurk (2001) on definitions of empathy, and on the relationship between intercultural dialogue and
the ability to “put yourself in the shoes” of members of other cultures. For DeTurk, there are serious
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Discrimination. John is a white man. Diane is a black woman. Diane often describes the
discrimination and racism she experiences to John. He is not in a position to fully
grasp what it is like to be a black woman. But he gets what it is like to suffer, to feel
in danger, to feel excluded, and so forth. So while he cannot fully project what it is
like to be a black woman, he can have empathy, and he has enough information to
know that Diane’s experiences are bad and frustrate her preferences.
Cases like Discrimination suggest that partial cognitive modeling is common. People like
John cannot fully grasp some experiences (like racism, sexism, homophobia, transphobia,
and so forth). But arguably, John can partially project some of the things Diane experiences
based on her testimony. This suggests that partial cognitive modeling is possible. 
Here is another way to put it. Suppose Diane tells John that she earns less than her
white male colleagues (at the same level of education, experience, etc.). Diane also tells
John that  her  boss  frequently  makes  sexist  and racist  comments  in  front  of  her.  Then,
suppose John says the following: 
“But... is this bad for you? I really have to ask. You see, I cannot project what it
is like to experience these things. I cannot imagine what you are going through.
I would have to be in your shoes to know what this is like. But I cannot, since I
am a white male. So tell me: Is it bad for a woman to hear sexist comments all
the time, or to be paid less than everyone else?”
Here, John’s cluelessness is surprising. Of course, John does not fully grasp what it is like
to experience racism or sexism. But John can imagine what it is like when people do not
accept who you are, or when you do not get what you deserve. So, John is in a position to
know that violations of pay equity and racist comments frustrate Diane’s preferences. Only
partial cognitive modeling can explain this. John cannot  fully project Diane’s situation to
himself. However, if John were  totally unable to project Diane’s situation to himself, he
would  not  be  able  to  empathize.  Therefore,  there  must  be  some  sort  of  intermediate
projection that John has access to.
Thus,  we  cannot  fully project  transformative  experience  through  cognitive
modeling. However, we can have a  partial picture of transformative experiences through
cognitive  modeling.  And  for  decisions  like  swimming  with  sharks,  partial  cognitive
modeling might be enough to make rational decisions. We do not fully grasp what it is like
obstacles to thinking that “members of one social group  [can] understand the experiences of another,
particularly across divisions of power” (ibid., 377).  However, she mentions various studies and examples
in which these obstacles are not unsurmountable (ibid., 377-81). Compare with Bailey (2018) and B. J.
Broome (2017).  See Paul (2017) on empathy and the metaphysics of first personal perspectives,  and
Cappelen and Dever (2017) for a reply.
12
to be attacked by sharks, but we might be in a position to rationally decide not to swim with
sharks.
However, one could object that the kind of partial cognitive modeling involved in a
case like Discrimination differs importantly from the kind of partial cognitive modeling
involved in shark attacks. Specifically, empathy is central in cases like Discrimination, but
seems absent from the partial cognitive modeling of shark attacks. So, why think that the
observations  pertaining  to  cases  like  Discrimination  matter  for  the  partial  cognitive
modeling of traumatic events?12
My response to this worry goes as follows. I think there are important similarities
between the two cases. Specifically, empathy can play a similar role for partial cognitive
modeling of shark attacks. For example, suppose John meets some shark attack survivors
(or  watches  a  documentary  about  shark  attack  survivors).  The  victims  talk  about  the
phantom pain they are dealing with, the activities they can no longer engage in, and so on.
It would be surprising if John were clueless and asked questions like this:
“But... Do you enjoy being in pain and not having the opportunity to engage in
certain activities? I cannot imagine what you are going through. I would have to
be in your shoes to know what this is like. But I cannot, since I am a not a shark
attack survivor. So tell me: Is it bad for a shark attack survivor to suffer, or to
have less capabilities?”
John’s cluelessness is as surprising as before. And that is because John is able to empathize.
John cannot  fully project a shark attack survivor’s situation to himself. But he can figure
out what it is like to suffer, or to have less capabilities.
3. Core Preferences and the Rationality of Deciding not to Swim with Sharks
Partial  cognitive modeling is  plausible.  It  is  a useful source of information for rational
decision-making. Even if it does not allow us to fully grasp what traumatic transformative
experiences are like, they help us see what is bad about them. 
But then, partial cognitive modeling can also be a source of information for other
decisions, such as having a child. We still need to account for the difference between these
two types of decisions. If we can rationally decide not to swim with sharks based on partial
12 I thank a referee for inviting me to discuss this objection.
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cognitive modeling, why can’t we make rational decisions pertaining to parenthood on the
same ground?
In  this  section,  I  argue  that  transformative  experiences  give  rise  a  problem for
rational decision-making only if the decision can lead to satisfying some of our (new) core
preferences, but can also frustrate other (new) core preferences. Based on partial cognitive
modeling, agents can know that swimming with sharks violates this condition. However,
the same is not true for decisions like having a child.
3.1. Shark Attacks and Rational Decision-Making
We do not know exactly how our core preferences will evolve after a traumatic event, such
as a shark attack.  But we know that some  core preferences will  not go away, such as:
having capabilities, avoiding pain,  etc.  Decisions like swimming with sharks, or having
your limbs amputated without anaesthesia, can change some of one’s core preferences. Yet,
suffering or losing capabilities goes against one’s future core preferences, and one knows,
based on partial cognitive modeling, that swimming with sharks can hardly contribute to
satisfying  our  (new)  core  preferences.  One  does  not  need  to  fully  grasp  what  these
experiences are like to have that kind of knowledge. So, one has enough information, from
partial cognitive modeling, to rationally exclude this decision.
For concreteness, suppose that,  after  being attacked by sharks, one’s preferences
could evolve as follows:13
New Core Preferences 1: Avoiding pain, learn first-aid techniques.
New Core  Preferences  2:   Having  capabilities,  lobby  for  the  use  of  shark  nets  or  the
increased monitoring of shores.
One does not know what one’s core preferences will  be after being attacked by sharks
(since there are two possible sets of future core preferences, and they are different from
each other). But one can see that being attacked by sharks will only frustrate one’s core
preferences.  Nothing in these possible future preferences structures will  be served by a
shark attack. So, one cannot know exactly what the pain or the loss of capabilities resulting
13 These putative new core preferences are inspired by the testimonies of shark attack survivors. See, e.g.,
Adolph (2019) and Carlsen (2012).
14
from shark attacks is like, but one can rationally decide, based on their information and
their possible future preferences, not to swim with hungry sharks.14
Thus, even if swimming with sharks is a transformative experience, one knows that
swimming with sharks can only frustrate one’s preferences. This is why we can rationally
rule out this decision.
3.2. Having a Child and Obstacles to Rational Decision-Making
Paul claims that many decisions involving transformative experiences, such as having a
child,  are  a  problem for  rational  decision-making.  My solution  is  compatible  with this
possibility. Transformative experiences involve a radical change in one’s preferences. They
are a problem for rational decision-making only if the decision will lead to satisfying some
of our (new) core preferences, but will also frustrate other (new) core preferences. This
condition  is  satisfied  when  one  decides  to  have  a  child.  After  having  a  child,  one’s
preferences could evolve as follows:
New Core Preferences 1: Seeing friends, sleeping well, have no responsibilities, etc.
New Core Preferences 2:  Unconditional love from a child, continuation of the family line,
etc.
With respect to New Core Preferences 1, the decision to have a child will frustrate one’s
core preferences. However, with respect to New Core Preferences 2, the decision to have a
child will satisfy one’s core preferences. This is why the rational evaluation of our decision
is so hard: We do not know exactly how our preferences will evolve over time.
Naturally, some aspects of parenthood can run counter to our core preferences. For
example, we have basic needs, such as eating and sleeping. These basic needs are part of
our core preferences. Having a child can seriously affect the quantity and quality of our
sleep.  But  this  inconvenience  pertaining  to  one  of  our  central  preferences  can  be
compensated for by satisfying new, future core preferences. For example, the experience of
parenthood can bring out new core preferences, such as the unconditional love from family
members, or the continuation of the family line. And one’s future self might tolerate sleep
deprivation if this is compensated for by the satisfaction of such other core preferences. 
14 Also,  one knows that  being attacked  by sharks  will  not  contribute  to  the  satisfaction of  one’s  other
preferences (e.g., it will not help one advocate for the rights of people with disabilities, it will not help
one lobby against the protection of white sharks, etc.). 
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This is an important dissymmetry with decisions like swimming with sharks. Being
attacked  by  sharks  will  lead  to  intense,  long-lasting  physical  and  psychological  pain.
Avoiding pain is one of our core preferences. We know this is not going to change. Also, we
know,  through  partial  cognitive  modeling,  that  this  great  inconvenience  will  not  be
compensated for by the satisfaction of new core preferences.
3.3. Core Preferences and the Putative Distinction Between Normal Outcomes and Sharky
Outcomes
The solution I offer is compatible with denying that there is an essential distinction between
types of outcomes. Recall that Campbell and Mosquera discuss the following escape route
on Paul’s behalf: The reason why decisions like not swimming with sharks are rational is
that  decisions  involving  sharky  outcomes  do  not  require  cognitive  modeling,  while
decisions involving normal outcomes require cognitive modeling. Campbell and Mosquera
raise a  serious worry for this  distinction—namely,  that the putative distinction between
normal  outcomes  and  sharky  outcomes  lead  to  a  discontinuity  problem  in  rational
evaluation.
My solution is that it is hard to make rational decisions involving transformative
experiences when the transformative experiences can lead to satisfying some of our (new)
core preferences, but can also frustrate other (new) core preferences. This is compatible
with thinking that all rational decisions involve partial or full cognitive modeling. Or, if you
prefer: The solution is compatible with denying the problematic distinction between types
of decisions that  require cognitive modeling and types of decisions that do not  require
cognitive modeling. So, my solution does not face Campbell and Mosquera’s worry.
One could object that my solution falls prey to another version of Campbell and
Mosquera’s worry. That is, one could argue that, on my solution, there is a discontinuity
between  the  outcomes  for  which  one  can  apply  partial  cognitive  modeling,  and  other
outcomes for which one cannot apply partial cognitive modeling.15 
However,  I  think  that  my  solution  does  not  face  this  problem.  For  illustration
purposes, consider the options on a spectrum discussed in section 1:
15 Another formulation of the worry could be this: There is a discontinuity between the outcomes for which
partial  cognitive modeling is  sufficient  for  rational  evaluation,  and other  outcomes for  which partial
cognitive  modeling  is  insufficient  for  rational  evaluation.  I  also  address  this  possibility  in  the  next
paragraphs.
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O1: Choose experientially different life 1, which involves one second of intense pain per
day.
O2: Choose experientially different life 2, which involves two seconds of intense pain per
day.
...
On: Choose experientially different life n. This life involves permanent intense pain.
My view says that there are some things we can evaluate in each of these options. Partial
cognitive  modeling  is  possible  for  each  of  these  options.  So,  there  is  no  discontinuity
between  the  outcomes  for  which  one  can  apply  partial  cognitive  modeling,  and  other
outcomes for which one cannot apply partial cognitive modeling. All the above outcomes
allow for partial cognitive modeling.
For instance, we can at least evaluate the amount of intense pain involved in each of
these options. We know that the pain involved with each option is getting worse and worse,
and we can partially evaluate each option on such grounds. So, we can make some partial
comparisons  between O1,  O2,...,  and  O5001.  This  is  an important  difference  between my
solution  and Paul’s.  We are  not  left  with  the  problematic  result  that,  although we can
compare O5000 and O5001, we cannot compare O1 and O5000.16
At some point, the option might involve enough pain, so that a rational agent will
never choose this option. Suppose this is option O5001. On my view, there is no discontinuity
between this option and the previous one. If there is too much pain involved in O5001, you
will also think that there is a serious problem with O5000. That is, in O5000, pain is  almost
sufficient to rationally exclude this option. Pain can be evaluated in each of these options,
and it is a growing concern in each of them. 
More generally, it is implausible that my view will face a discontinuity objection.
This type of objection targets views that sharply distinguish types of outcomes (like: the
ones that do not require cognitive modeling, and the ones that can be evaluated without
cognitive modeling). But my view is compatible with denying such sharp distinctions. The
reason why rational agents can ignore options involving sharky outcomes is not that there is
16 This is Campbell and Mosquera’s objection. Suppose that O5000 is a normal outcome while O5001 is a
sharky outcome.  Then,  the crux of  Campbell  and Mosquera’s  discontinuity objection is  this:  Agents
cannot compare O1 with O5000, because they cannot grasp what these lives are like unless they experience
them. However, agents can conclude that O5000 is better than O5001. This discontinuity in the evaluations
agents can make is odd.
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a sharp distinction between sharky outcomes and other ones. We can treat all outcomes
“equally,” with a graded notion of cognitive modeling. 
3.4. Other Cases: Heavenly Outcomes
Finally,  the  solution  I  offer  is  compatible  with  thinking  that  other  types  of  decisions
involving transformative experiences are not problematic. So far, most of our discussion
has been revolving around bad decisions, such as swimming with hungry sharks. These
decisions involve bad transformative experiences, and thus can be rationally dismissed. The
argument  should  also  apply  to  corresponding  good  transformative  experiences.  For
instance, consider the following case:
Talent Pill. You are a professional musician with a precarious career. You are offered a
“talent pill” that will  give you the ability to be one of the best performers in the
world. For instance, the pill will give you the will and the ability to concentrate and
improve, so that you become one of the best performers in the world. Surely, you do
not know what it is like to be one of the best performers in the world. This would be a
whole new experience to you. However, you know that this decision will not frustrate
your future preferences.
In Talent Pill, the decision has “heavenly” outcomes (Campbell and Mosquera 2020, 3552;
Sullivan 2018). You may not know exactly what the outcomes will be like, and how your
future preferences will be satisfied, but you know that the outcomes will be good and will
satisfy your preferences. Plausibly, you can rationally choose to take the pill. The fact that
this  decision  involves  a  transformative  experience  does  not  seem to  be  an  obstacle  to
rational  decision-making.  My  solution  is  compatible  with  this  possibility,  because  the
decision to take the pill can lead to satisfying some of your (new) core preferences, but
cannot frustrate other core preferences.
3.5. The Objection from Remote Possibilities
Here is another objection against my solution. There is a remote possibility that deciding to
swim with hungry sharks will satisfy one’s core preferences. Perhaps the sharks will not
attack you. Or perhaps your future core preferences will evolve in an unpredictable way,
and your decision to swim with sharks will contribute to satisfying these preferences. So,
how can we be sure that swimming with sharks can only frustrate our preferences? 
This kind of objection has to do with the contentious issue of relevant alternatives in
rational  decision-making.  It  is  an  open  question  how rational  agents  should  deal  with
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alternatives or possibilities that are highly unlikely. However, this issue is not specific to
solution I have offered to the Shark Problem. This is a tangential problem pertaining to
rational belief and decision-making in general.
Compare: In epistemology, philosophers often assume that, if rational agents have
no  evidence  that  they  are  deceived,  their  deliberation  can  ignore  or  exclude  remote
possibilities (i.e., events or alternatives that are highly unlikely) such as “I am a deceived
brain  in  a  vat”  (e.g.,  Worsnip 2019).  In  ethics,  philosophers  often  assume that  rational
agents can make a decision based on a set  of  relevant alternatives and outcomes (e.g.,
Wedgwood 2017). Suppose that ignoring such remote possibilities is correct. Then, just as
one can ignore remote possibilities like “I am a deceived brain in a vat,” one can ignore
remote possibilities like “Being attacked by a shark will satisfy my preferences.” In both
cases, we are dealing with the same phenomenon—namely, events or possibilities that are
highly unlikely.
4. Conclusion
Transformative experiences could sometimes be an obstacle to rational decision-making.
Yet, not all decisions involving transformative experiences raise a problem for rationality.
The decision to avoid swimming with hungry white sharks is one of them. How can we
explain this? For Paul (2014), the reason why decisions involving sharky outcomes are not
an  obstacle  to  rational  decision-making  is  that  this  type  of  decision  does  not  require
cognitive  modeling.  Campbell  and  Mosquera  (2020)  have  argued  that  introducing  a
distinction between normal and sharky outcomes leads to a discontinuity in the rational
evaluation of outcomes. I agree with Campbell and Mosquera that we should not make a
distinction between types of outcomes. My solution to this problem is that some decisions
involving transformative experiences allow for partial cognitive modeling. This allows us
to see that some decisions, like swimming with hungry white sharks, can only frustrate our
preferences. Thus, rational agents can dismiss such options.
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